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1. Introduction
“A democratic regime is one in which political power is based on the will of the peo-
ple, and which provides all citizens with the opportunity to participate equally in the po-
litical life of the state”1. The EU Treaties indeed claim that the Union is now a
democratic regime with its own system of democracy. This is evident from the pream-
ble of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) whereby the EU draws inspiration from
certain values including democracy; it declares attachment to the principle and also de-
sires the democratic and efficient functioning of its institutions2.
Both the TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) re-
fer to the ‘peoples of Europe’3 showing that the Union is intended to be more than just
a simple association of states; it is designed to bring together the citizens of Europe in
unity. This suggests that according to the Treaty of Lisbon it is they who limited their
sovereign rights through the Member States to create a body of law which binds them
and the states themselves4, and that the powers of the Union come from the people not
just governments. This presupposes some form of participation of the people in the pro-
cess of integration. It has been long established that citizens have been given the possi-
bility to rely on Treaty rights in the national courts through the doctrine of direct effect5.
People therefore naturally wish to have a voice in European lawmaking through demo-
cratic processes.
In Art. 10(1) TEU it is acknowledged that the functioning of the EU is now founded
on representative democracy. Yet the Treaty of Lisbon received strong criticism from
the German Constitutional Court in the Gauweiler case6, claiming that the EU is still far
from being such a regime. It will be examined in this paper whether the above men-
tioned claim to being a representative democracy is legitimate or still more needs to be
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1 Neuwahl, Wheatley, The EU and Democracy – Lawful and Legitimate Intervention in the Do-
mestic Affairs of States?, Chapter 13, in: Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union, eds
Arnull, Wincott (OUP, 2002), p. 223.
2 Treaty on European Union [2010] OJ C 83/13, Preamble paras 2, 4 and 7.
3 TEU Preamble para 13; Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/47,
Preamble para 1.
4 See Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, para 3 on the limitation of sovereignty.
5 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1,
p. 12.
6 2 BvE 2/08 Gauweiler v Treaty of Lisbon, Judgment of 30 June 2009 (hereinafter ’Gauweiler’).
done to achieve this after the new Treaties. Our discussion will also focus on whether
the supposed democratic features of the EU are sufficient to legitimate the process of
integration. Due to the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty being very recent,
there is little experience yet on their practical application. However the new institu-
tional setting, the processes and the increased role of the European Parliament and na-
tional parliaments will provide plenty of guidance to examine these fascinating issues
in detail.
2. The democracy challenge
2.1. The need for the EU to be democratic
Does it matter whether the EU is democratic? After all it is not a sovereign state, so
some might even question the necessity of this discussion. However it would be odd for
the Treaties to mention the concept of democracy so openly if there was no expectation
for people to be represented in the Union. In fact even if the EU is not a state, it can nei-
ther be said that it is merely a classic international organisation such as the United Na-
tions or the Council of Europe.
The identity of the Union7 has been debated ever since it was created, causing
several theories to be developed. The initial arguments centred on the ideas of
intergovernmentalism and supranationalism8. The former was shown by the Luxem-
bourg compromise in 1966 allowing governments to retain total control of the legisla-
tive process. The Van Gend en Loos judgment9 on the other hand suggested that the EU
was rather an entity above the nation states. Others suggested ideas of federalism,
whereby a constitutional settlement was contemplated by delegating power to a higher
form of government10, and functionalism that focused on fulfilling the needs of the peo-
ple, rather than the form of regime under which this was to be done11. Anyhow it be-
came clear that the Union was to become more of a state-like entity with its own legal
system12.
Since this early perception of the Union, it has undergone very fundamental changes
in the last two decades. The Treaty of Maastricht introduced the Common Foreign and
Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs (later named Police and Judicial
Co-operation in Criminal Matters) as separate pillars. The latter of these now has full
application after the abolition of the pillar structure by the Lisbon Treaty. This means
that the Union has increasingly been tapping into areas which were traditionally re-
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9 Supra, note 5.
10 Rosamund, Theories of European Integration, Macmillan, 2000, p. 1.
11 Ibidem, p. 1–2.
12 Supra, note 4.
served to nation states. The EU was also creating more legislation more intensely than
ever before13.
There is no doubt that once EU legislation was increasingly affecting their rights,
people started to have similar expectations for the EU as for domestic politics and polit-
ical institutions14. Additionally it has been observed that as Europeans became more
prosperous they were less willing to accept government by unaccountable elites15.
Therefore there is now a sense of a need for democracy in Europe. Only then will the
process of integration be accepted by citizens and this process will only become legiti-
mate in their eyes. They must therefore be given a chance to influence decisions that are
affecting their lives. It is not settled, however, in what way this must be achieved. The
Gauweiler case acknowledged that this does not need to be done in the same way as it is
in Member States16. Nevertheless it is submitted here that the democratic processes
must be visible and should confer a real possibility of participation on citizens. Whether
this has been achieved is a matter for detailed analysis.
2.2. Democracy in the Lisbon Treaty
As seen above, the new Treaty makes clear references to the democratic commit-
ment of the Union. Title II of the TEU is entirely devoted to ‘provisions on democratic
principles’.
Art. 9 TEU exposes the principle of equality of citizens. Art. 10 TEU points out two
distinct features of democracy: representative and participatory democracy. The latter
is developed by Art. 11(4) TEU, which includes the ‘citizens’ initiative’, allowing
a minimum of one million citizens to invite the Commission to submit a proposal for
consideration. Arts 11(1) to (3) TEU aim to allow increased citizen participation
through exchanges of views, dialogue and consultations. Art. 12 TEU gives greater
rights to national parliaments in the legislative process.
Before considering these institutional changes in more detail in section 3, other new
features must be pointed out. The TFEU in Arts 2–6 contains a catalogue of EU compe-
tences whose aim is to ensure that these are clearly observed and the areas reserved for
the Member States are not encroached upon. Art. 6(1) TEU makes the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights legally binding, which offers increasing protection for citizens under
EU law, and ensures that these rights are not hidden away in the judgments of the Court
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), as before. The protection of such rights is a
typical feature of a democratic system. As will be seen below, the ‘co-decision proce-
dure’ has now become the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’17, indicating that the in-
volvement of the Parliament is now a standard feature of the legislative process.
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17 See Art. 294 TFEU.
Despite these efforts of the drafters of the Treaty, the German Constitutional Court
still claims that the Treaty of Lisbon does not lead to a new level of development of de-
mocracy18. Nevertheless it must be acknowledged that democracy in the EU has been
made more visible by the new Treaty. More possibilities have been opened up for peo-
ple to participate and have themselves heard through consultation, the citizens’ initia-
tive and the enhanced role of national parliaments. It is another matter that this is not
considered sufficient by some. The opportunities are there to be used.
3. The democratic institutions of the Union
The institutions of the Union are set out in Art. 13(1) TEU. The three key players in
Union law making are: the Parliament, the Council and the Commission19. These are
very different as regards their composition. The Parliament is where citizens are repre-
sented, the Council brings together Member State governments, while the Commission
is composed of experts responsible for a particular field. So how can citizens influence
the decision making process? After all it is they who need to determine public authority
in a democracy20. The role of the institutions and ways ordinary people can participate
in these processes will now be examined.
3.1. The European Parliament
The European Parliament (EP) is a key institution for ensuring legitimacy through
representative democracy, as it is where ‘citizens are directly represented at Union
level’21. It now has equal powers to the Council in the ordinary legislative procedure as
defined in Art. 294 TFEU. This procedure now applies to 40 new areas22 after amend-
ing the old treaties, giving the Parliament more influence in law making than ever be-
fore. Representation is degressively proportional, with small Member States being
guaranteed a minimum of 6 seats23. Since 1979 the Parliament is directly elected, every
citizen of the EU having the right to vote or stand as a candidate in its elections24. In
many respects it resembles national parliaments where a state’s citizens are represented.
This feature aims to give the EU greater legitimacy through increasing democracy.
However, this institution has been subject to fierce criticism. In Gauweiler, the appli-
cants argued that the Parliament did not comprise the characteristics of a representative
body since Member States with low number of inhabitants are granted a disproportion-
ately large number of votes25. The Court agreed with this saying that the Parliament
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23 Art. 14(2) TEU.
24 Art. 22(2) TFEU.
25 Gauweiler, para 104.
cannot comply with the principle of equal political right to vote of all citizens, as re-
quired at national level26. It essentially calls into question the principle enshrined in
Art. 9 TEU with respect to the EP. It also points out that it lacks a system of government
and opposition27. Others also comment that it has several weaknesses when compared
to national parliaments, such as not having a right of legislative initiative (which is re-
served to the Commission) and not having a decisive function in all EU law making28. It
has even been claimed prior to Lisbon that no one who votes in EU elections has
a strong sense of affecting critical political choices29.
These criticisms are true to a large extent since although there are political groups at
European level, they are composed of representatives of national parties and none of
them is likely to have a majority in the Parliament. Therefore parties cannot just rely on
their majority to pass legislation conforming to a set of policies, as it is often done at na-
tional level. In parliamentary systems legislative chambers and governments are often
interlinked (just like in the UK House of Commons), so voters can choose not only
MPs, but also the party whose MPs will form members of the government including the
Prime Minister (or other head of government). This is not possible at EU level as elec-
tors only elect people who can then vote on legislative proposals without being able to
carry out a policy programme. Furthermore, national parties often tend to reserve their
best candidates for national elections, leaving less able or at least less well-known fig-
ures to stand as MEPs. These representatives are less likely to be able to connect to vot-
ers at home, causing even more alienation of people from European politics. This
means that it must be accepted that the European Parliament still cannot be equated to
national legislatures, even after Lisbon.
On the other hand there are additional features that enable the EP to control EU proce-
dures. It has already been stressed that a lot more legislation are subject to parliamentary
control than under the old treaties. In addition the European Parliament also has some influ-
ence over the European Commission, a body responsible not only for initiating legislation,
but also having an executive role. First of all under Art. 17(7) TEU it is the EP that proposes
a candidate for the President of the Commission and then it is responsible for electing him
or her. According to Art. 17(8) TEU the Commission once appointed is responsible to the
Parliament. The latter can even vote on a motion of censure of the Commission.
While the Parliament has limited power in overseeing the work of the other institu-
tions it has some role of consultation. For example the European Council President
must present a report to it after each meeting30. It must be consulted before appointment
of members of the European Central Bank and the Court of Auditors31. It can also pro-
pose one panel member for giving opinion on the judges to be appointed to the CJEU32.
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30 Art. 15(6) TEU.
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This shows that the EP does have some role related to the other decision makers, al-
beit clearly a very limited one. However, the problem regarding equality of citizens can
be countered. The German Federal Government in the Gauweiler case pointed out that
the reason for not having equality of voters in the European elections is due to the prin-
ciple of equality of states33. Tomuschat also observes that the Court’s argument in this
respect is erroneous as it misunderstands the logic of a federal entity. By that rule the
US Senate (upper chamber) would lack democratic legitimacy34. This problem is not
a unique EU feature as even Member States cannot always achieve equality in domestic
constituencies35. Domestic systems are still regarded as legitimate.
A possible solution could be a European list from where let’s say 10 per cent of
MEPs could be elected36. However it would still have to be ensured that small Member
States get sufficient seats to have at least some voice in European politics.
3.2. The Council and the Commission
The other legislative institutions possess quite different features to the Parliament
and it is questionable, whether their respective roles fit into the idea of the Union’s
functioning being founded on representative democracy.
The Council comprises the ministers of the democratically elected governments of
the Member States37, so it does represent citizens, albeit indirectly. It contributes to
EU-level democracy since together with the Parliament it is said to give the EU a ‘dou-
ble democratic mandate’38. Moravcsik also agrees with this and claims that indirect rep-
resentation in the Council together with direct representation through the EP with
increasing powers is sufficient to ensure the representation of citizens39.
The ‘double qualified majority’under Art. 16(4) TEU and Art. 238(3) TFEU also has
some legitimising effect40 as votes in favour of a legislation now have to comprise at least
65% cent of the population of the Member States. So unequal distribution of votes cannot
be argued against this procedure. The Council can therefore be seen as more of a repre-
sentative of the majority of the Union’s population. On the other hand this still does not
make the Council a representative body of citizens, especially that opposition parties are
not represented there. It is therefore questionable as to what extent this institution can be
a representative of the views of the people, even after the Treaty amendments.
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38 White Paper, p. 4.
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Union, “Journal of Common Market Studies” 2002, vol. 40, 603, p. 605.
40 Discussed in Wohlfahrt, The Lisbon Case: a Critical Summary, “German Law Journal” 2009,
vol. 10, 1278, p. 1279, although the author points out the Court’s critical approach towards this argument.
The Commission is the EU’s executive body, also having overseeing, coordinating
and external representative functions, and it has the sole right of legislative initiative41.
It is a completely independent body. Its members are proposed by national Govern-
ments, but then recommended by the President-elect and then elected by the Parliament
as mentioned above. It is comprised of experts of different fields, so is regarded as
a non-representative technocratic body. Its members are not directly accountable to citi-
zens, although as already mentioned the Parliament has some control over it.
Some have argued in the early years of European integration that legitimacy could
be ensured simply through the gains which technocracy secured42. It is true that the
Commission is free from political pressure from voters, enabling it to fulfil its role in
the best possible way, without having to engage in mistaken policies just to please vot-
ers. However at the same time it may act against the interests of EU citizens in the ab-
sence of direct democratic control. The 1999 corruption scandal shows that the
Commission indeed needs to be closely scrutinised. So it is submitted here that while
there are benefits from having an expert led body in the EU, the Commission will con-
tinue to contribute to the democratic deficit of the Union and its nature will make it
harder to legitimate the EU in the eyes of the peoples of Europe.
3.3. National Parliaments
Member State Parliaments now have an increased role in European law-making and
they can directly take part in it in accordance with the procedure in Art. 12 TEU. They
can no longer be regarded as mere national institutions, but must also be construed as
institutions of the Union43. Their involvement had been identified as an issue by the
White Paper, which now seems to have been put into effect44. First of all they have
a role in being consulted and documents and draft legislative acts must be forwarded to
them45. An eight-week period is given for them to consider these, before they can be
placed on the provisional agenda of the Council46. EU nationals tend to be more closely
connected to their home country’s parliaments so this should enable them more influ-
ence over EU legislation. National parliaments can therefore provide a major source of
public debate on important European issues47. This procedure contributes to ensuring
that European politics is brought closer to the people.
It is also important to ensure that the Union institutions comply with the principle of
subsidiarity whereby decisions are taken as closely to the citizen as possible, meaning
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that the EU should only act if the objectives of the action cannot be achieved by the
Member States48. The national legislators can now oversee this under the procedure in
Protocol No. 249. Art. 5 obliges that draft acts contain detailed reasons regarding their
compatibility with the principles. If parliaments are still not satisfied, under Arts 7(2)
and 7(3) they can issue a “yellow card” through reasoned opinion by one third of na-
tional parliaments regarding non-compliance of the act, or an “orange card” by a simple
majority. These seem to make national legislators quite powerful in the process. There
are two issues to consider. First of all these procedures may be regarded as purely nomi-
nal, since if there is so much opposition from Member States it is very difficult to get the
necessary qualified majority in the Council anyway50. Secondly will parliaments actu-
ally use these powers? Auel observed that they even rarely make use of their formal
rights to influence their home government’s vote in the Council51. While the opposition
may be able to take part in the debate, they usually have to go with the governing major-
ity’s position. This could well mean that national parliaments will only oppose mea-
sures when national representatives also oppose it in the Council.
The way in which these procedures can nevertheless contribute to securing democ-
racy is through public debate at the national level. People should be able to have their
say at national forums about European issues in their countries, which would then be
transmitted to the EU legislature. At the moment there is a big question mark as to how
this will turn out in practice. There is a danger that there will me ‘more votes’ in discuss-
ing domestic issues such as tax, health care and education and there will continue to be
a lack of interest in areas of EU competence.
3.4. Other legislative procedures
It must be mentioned that there are certain procedures of legislation that allow the
democratic institutions to be effectively bypassed. Art. 290 TFEU allows legislative
powers to be delegated to the Commission, or legislative acts can confer implementing
powers on the Commission (or the Council in some cases) under Art. 291 TFEU. Ac-
cording to Chalmers et al. 69 per cent of Regulations are in the form of delegated legis-
lation52. These are made behind closed doors, without public scrutiny, through the
procedure known as comitology53. The Parliament has gained very limited rights in the
procedure as pointed out by Hofmann54, although it can now oppose certain measures
within the “regulatory procedure with scrutiny”55 since 2006.
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These seem problematic on the face of it, but it is submitted that they do not in fact
call into question the democratic nature of the EU. Delegated legislation is very widely
used at national level such as statutory instruments in the UK. Art. 290 TFEU only al-
lows delegation ‘to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of legislative
acts’ meaning that the most important legislation will still be subject to the standard
procedures. Should these be abused, the Parliament or the Council can always revoke
the delegation under Art. 290(2), reasserting democratic control in the process. Even
though these procedures may be less democratic, they are necessary for the efficient
functioning of the EU and the better allocation of resources.
3.5. Processes of participatory democracy
As we have seen, Art. 10(3) TEU refers to citizens’ right to participate in the demo-
cratic life of the Union. These are secured through the openness of procedures and are
also very much essential to ensure the democratic functioning of the EU institutions.
The CJEU stated that “openness contributes to conferring greater legitimacy on the in-
stitutions in the eyes of European citizens and increasing their confidence in them”56.
There are several manifestations of these in the Treaty also. Art. 11 TEU introduces the
‘citizens’ initiative’as discussed above in section 2.3. Art. 15 TFEU encourages partici-
pation of civil society and its paragraph 3 gives EU citizens a right of access to docu-
ments57. Further, Art. 296 TFEU paragraph 2 states that legal acts must state the reasons
on which they are based. These must be adequate so that the persons concerned can as-
certain the reasons for the measure and the competent court can exercise its power of
review58.
There has been some doubt as to the strength of these provisions and individuals’
ability to seek judicial review against legislation. The argument based on a violation of
the duty to state reasons failed both in the Biotechnology Directive and the Deposit
Guarantee Directive cases59. It was held that for the application of subsidiarity it was
sufficient to state that the scope of the protection provided by the Directive has effect on
[intra-Union] trade60 and that even no express reference to subsidiarity was required61.
In fact it is important to state that until now there has not been a case which failed on the
principle of subsidiarity, which calls into question the strength of judicial protection.
On the other hand cases regarding refusals to access to documents have succeeded
in Sweden and Turco62 and Williams63. These decisions clearly show that the Court is in
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fact prepared to scrutinise institutional decisions on the request of individuals, fulfilling
the purpose of openness as set out in Recital 2 of Regulation 1049/200164. These demo-
cratic features of the Union will contribute to the legitimacy of the integration process
which will be the focus of the next section.
4. The legitimacy of the EU
We have discussed the features of EU democracy and saw that the European Parlia-
ment now plays a significant part in most EU law-making with national parliaments
also been given some involvement in the process lately. These are complemented with
the range of possibilities for citizens to get information about the EU and participate in
its procedures. But are these enough to legitimate the European integration process?
Arnull distinguishes two types of legitimacy: formal and social legitimacy65. The
powers to the EU have been voluntarily transferred and the treaties have been freely en-
tered into by states, so the former is difficult to call into question. But social legitimacy
entails that the allocation and exercise of authority commands general acceptance66. In
section 2 we have established that the EU is a different entity from a nation-state, al-
though it now has a number of state-like features. Commentators have also observed
that since the EU has very different institutions from national governments it would be
difficult to have the same idea of representative democracy for it67. Even the German
Constitutional Court concluded that as long as the principle of conferral is adhered to in
the EU, the legitimation provided by national parliaments and governments comple-
mented and sustained by the directly elected EP is sufficient in principle68. So even if
the EU is not a complete representative democracy, at least if judged by nation-state
standards, it can still be legitimate together with the integration process. After all it was
the national parliaments which gave consent to their countries joining the EU (together
with citizens through referenda). They still remain in control of the states’EU member-
ship as now withdrawal from the Union is expressly permitted69.
So where does the problem lie then? The hostile attitude of some segments of the
European public is still visible nowadays, for example through the recent failed refer-
enda. One possible solution to the question may be that the public still does not know
much about the EU. This was identified a decade ago by the White Paper alleging that
Member States did not communicate well about what the EU was doing and many peo-
ple did not know the difference between the institutions70. In addition people still
thought of EU rules as foreign laws71. In this respect the role of the media and the press
would be crucial. However the White Paper’s criticism is still valid today. Ordinary
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people are unlikely to look at EU specific portals online and it is hard to find many re-
ports on the EU agenda in ordinary newspapers’ front pages. At a national level, in the
UK for example, pure domestic issues such as health care, tax, education, tuition fees,
budget cuts, together with foreign conflicts and natural disasters continue to dominate
the political agenda.
Another issue discussed by Weiler is that that there is still no European ‘demos’72,
including a feeling of ‘being European’. There are only “peoples” of Europe as opposed
to “people” and they are reluctant to take part in European democratic life. This is
clearly linked to the lack of popular understanding of the integration process. In the
1950s the desire for peace, unity and economic rebuilding provided a clear rationale73.
Now the process is a lot more complex. Europeans need to understand it a lot better in
order to feel part of the same political community.
Finally the level of mistrust of the German Constitutional Court is striking in the
Gauweiler judgment. The German Court does not trust that the institutions will keep an
appropriate check on each other to see if they are acting ultra vires74. However it would
be essential in a democratic system that the institutions are trusted by the public and na-
tional authorities, only then can they all see the process as fully legitimate.
5. Conclusion
It has been said that the EU now approaches a polity of a traditional representative
democracy after the European Parliament’s significant increase of powers75. While this
is certainly true, the inter-governmental element can still be very strongly felt through
the role of the Council. It must be recalled that the expert-led European Commission is
still very powerful after Lisbon and such an institution is not present in traditional de-
mocracies. New arrangements have been made for citizen participation and national
parliamentary oversight of EU processes, but these are still considered to be weak.
While the foundations of democracy are now present at EU-level to some extent, these
still do not actually make the EU a full representative democracy.
It has been argued that due to the nature of the EU, this finding does not mean that
the EU and the integration process cannot be legitimated in the eyes of citizens. The
changes by the new treaties have increased the possibilities to have their say in Euro-
pean politics. What is needed is better information about the nature of the EU, the bene-
fits of integration and the work of the institutions. Both the governments and the media
should take part in communicating effectively the democratic qualities of the Union.
Only then can a common European political culture be formed and only then will popu-
lar acceptance of the EU be increased across the 27-nation entity.
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This article addresses and responds to the question of changes in the European Union gover-
nance and how we can legitimate the process of European integration according to internal facili-
ties. Some of the main conclusions refer to the lack of institutions capable of performing their
functions as well as the key elements for achieving possible changes towards democracy.
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